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We can prove (see (E1) in appendix) that  
-1 / (2 P1b – 1 ) ≤ –[(1 – P3b)2 P1b – P3b2 (1 – P1b)] / (P1b – P3b)2
and that [(1 – P3b)2 P1b – P3b2 (1 – P1b)] can only be positive ( see (E2) in appendix). 
So (19) ≤ (20). 
Therefore the maximum value of E(U-u), with two agents in electoral period, is (20). 
  
4. Contract with two agents in the non-electoral period. 
As we have already said, in the non-electoral period the politician will prefer stability in the 
banking system and price stability. Therefore, in this period the politician’s utility expected net 
value will be: 
(21) E(U-u) = [G (1 + R) - u(Tb) – u(Tp)] P2b P1p + [G – u(Tb) – u(tp)] P2b (1 – P1p) + 
                          + [g (1 + r) - u(tb) – u(Tp)] (1 – P2b) P2p + [g – u(tb) – u(tp)] (1 – P2b) (1 – P2p)= 
                   = H’ – u(Tb) P2b – u(tb) (1 – P2b) – u(Tp) B – u(tp) (1 – B) 
where 
(22) H’ = G P2b ( 1 + R P1p ) + g (1 – P2b ) (1 + r P2p)               
BA’s incentive and participation constraint is that they are  
(23) E(Ib | eb = 1) ≥ E(Ib | eb = 0) 
(24) E(Ib | eb = 1) ≥ 0. 
Likewise the incentive and  participation constraints for CB will be 
(25) E(Ip | ep = 1) ≥ E(Ip | ep = 0) 
(26) E(Ip | ep = 1) ≥ 0.21 
As in the previous section, the various cases that can eventuate need to be analysed. This analysis 
reveals that the possible solutions to the problem of optimization are the following22: 
                                                 
21 See appendix B.) for the solution to the problem of constrained optimization.  
22 Other solutions, which result by the first-order conditions, are the following : 
iii)     tb = Tb = 0  if  P0b = P2b
iv)    tb = -Cb P0b  /(P2b – P0b),   Tb = Cb (1 – P0b) / (P2b – P0b)  if P0b ≤ 1/2 
v)     tp = -A Cp / (B – A),   Tp = (1 – A) Cp / (B – A)    if  A ≤ 1/2      
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          i)    tb = -Tb      with     Tb = Cb / (2 P2b – 1)   if    P0b ≤ 1/2 < P2b  
(27)  
        ii)    tp = -Cp / (2 B – 1),   Tp = -tp   if  A ≤ 1/2 < B 
These solutions derive from the hypothesis made that when the two agents make an effort, they 
expect a benefit large enough to cover the cost incurred to achieve the goal. If on the other hand 
they make no effort they will be punished by the politician. The punishment is the politician’s 
reward  to the agents when they reach a bad performance. In this case, therefore, the agents obtain a 
negative expected benefit. 
Keeping in mind that the politician’s expected utility function in the non-electoral period is: 
(28) E(U – u ) = H’ – u(Tb) P2b - u(tb) (1 - P2b) - u(Tp) B - u(tp) (1 - B) 
If we substitute the incentive payments in the politician’s utility function E(U – u), as we did in the 
previous case, we obtain  
(29) E(U – u) = H’- (1/2) {[Cb2 / (2 P2b - 1)] + [Cp2 / (2 B -1)]}  
 
5. Contract with a single agent in the electoral period. 
Let us now consider the case where both the functions are delegated to a single authority, the central 
bank. To see whether this situation is advantageous for the politician, we have to calculate the 
expected utility and compare it with the expected utility with two separate authorities. 
We suppose that the politician will offer four different incentive payments  to the CB, according to 
whether four different events take place. In particular, the politician will give to the agent 
    
T10         if                 E1 =  Bs∩-Ps 
T11           “                E2 =  Bs∩Ps 
T01           “                E3 = -Bs∩Ps 
T00           “                E4 = -Bs∩-Ps 
                                                                                                                                                                  
However, these solutions, which are not very interesting from an economic point of view, will be disregarded; only i) 
will be considered. This does not change the results. 
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